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5 Figure 1. Two logics of performance management: control-oriented performance management and 















































































































11 Making performance management relevant in complex and inter- 
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15 Modern  public  service  systems  tackle  many  complex  issues  by  operating  across  institutional 
16 boundaries. Performance management must operate in this context without clear lines of accountability 
or central authority. This paper introduces and develops the theoretical mechanism of ‘performance 
attraction’ to describe how outcomes and associated performance indicators can operate as organising 
18 instruments in inter-institutional contexts by attracting, rather than directing, institutional behaviour. 
19 
20 Design 
21 We explore the ‘performance attractor’ role played by outcomes through a multiple case study analysis 
22 of three prominent outcomes frameworks operating at the regional, national and international levels: 
23 the Scottish Government’s National Performance Framework, the Western Australian Alliance to End 
24 Homelessness  Outcomes  Measurement  and  Evaluation  Framework,  and  the  United  Nations’ 
25 Sustainable Development Goals. 
26 Findings 
27 
28 We find support for two theorised mechanisms facilitated by the performance attractor concept: (1), 
that  performance  attractors  enable  coordination  by  creating  a  shared  sense  of  responsibility for 
interdependent goals while also permitting autonomous navigation of individual contexts, and (2), that 
30 performance  attractors  support  performance  improvement  by  motivating  collective  learning and 
31 adaptation informed by institutional interdependencies. Cases relied primarily on voluntary adoption of 
32 outcomes frameworks, rather than utilising more coercive forms of accountability. Further studies 





The paper contributes to a growing body of critical literature that has explored alternatives to traditional 
control-oriented performance management in complex and inter-institutional settings. We describe 
38 design principles that policymakers and practitioners can adopt to construct more effective performance 



























































12  The public sector is confronted with many complex social policy problems which require the 
negotiation of interdependencies across multiple tiers of government, diverse public service 
organisations and a wide range of external partners (Halligan et al., 2012). New Public Management 
14 reforms such as agencification, decentralisation, and marketisation have exacerbated this problem by 
15 contributing to fragmentation and dilution of accountabilities (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007; Rajala 
16 et al., 2019). In this context, governments, public service agencies and hybrid partnerships have 
increasingly  turned  toward  inter-institutional  outcomes  frameworks  to  coordinate  the  actions of 
multiple actors toward shared goals. Governments such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Scotland, 
18 Wales and Northern Ireland have developed outcomes frameworks to carry forward a whole-of- 
19 government strategic approach. Inter-institutional performance measurement and management (PMM) 
20 systems have also proliferated to support hybrid and integrated responses to tackling systemic 
challenges (Van Dooren et al. 2010; Mollinger-Sabha et al. 2019). This approach is typified at the 
international level by perhaps the best-known outcomes framework currently extant, the UN’s 17 
22 Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs) within the Agenda 2030 framework. 
23 
24  PMM systems operating in an inter-institutional context are known to face two significant 
challenges. Firstly, traditional PMM theory assumes the existence of a sufficiently powerful and 
centralised 
authority, functioning as a ‘principal’ in Agency Theory terms (Jensen and Meckling 1976), to enforce 
26 the cooperation and motivation of performance-managed ‘agents’ through results-linked extrinsic 
27 incentives.  In  many  inter-institutional  contexts  however,  no  such  authority  exists  to  enforce 
28 accountabilities or impose incentives (Moynihan et al. 2011). ‘Agents’ are also likely to face internal 
directives for which accountability is likely more direct and immediate (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008). 
Secondly, the causality of social outcomes is also far more complex than organisational outputs, making 
30 causal inference difficult and further problematizing the application of results-based accountability 
31 (French et al. 2020). The imposition of linear results-based management in this context is likely to 
produce a range of deleterious performance paradoxes, including gaming, spiralling transaction costs, 
and goal displacement (Van Thiel and Leeuw 2002). A linear conception of social change also 
33 suppresses the innovation required to address entrenched, complex social problems (Mollinger-Sahba 
34 et al. 2020). 
35 
A growing volume of critical PMM literature in the public (Moynihan et al. 2011; Jakobsen et al. 2017; 
Rajala et al. 2019; French et al. 2020) and private sectors (Melynk et al. 2014; Bourne et al. 2018) has 
37 argued  that  PMM  theory,  which  is  built  on  the  assumption  of  centralised  authority,  vertical 
38 accountability regimes and extrinsic incentive systems, must be rethought in complex and inter- 
39 institutional contexts. Recommendations from this body of literature share a number of common 
threads: to maximise local and professional autonomy rather than constrain it through externally- 
imposed performance measures, to focus on emergent learning rather than performance accountancy, 
41 to foster internal motivation rather than imposing extrinsic incentives, and to use measures in boundary- 
42 crossing dialogue rather than as technical management controls. While scholarship has provided useful 
43 theoretical avenues to extend or even transcend PMM theory, and despite growing international interest 
(Jakobsen et al. 2017; Lowe et al. 2020), the literature has so far offered few practical methods of 
45 reforming PMM systems to embed these characteristics. 
46 This paper introduces and develops the theoretical concept of ‘performance attraction’ to describe the 
47 role and function which outcomes and associated indicators might play in a context where direct results control and accountability is impossible or counterproductive to enforce. Drawing from the construct 
of ‘attractors’ in complexity theory, this theoretical mechanism describes how outcomes and associated 
49 performance measures can attract rather than direct institutional behaviour by building interdependent 
50 values and visions, and by using performance information to facilitate collective learning and adaption 
51 in complex and dynamic contexts. We explore this role in an empirical case study analysis of three 
inter-institutional PMM frameworks operating at different levels of analysis (regional, national and 






































10 Theoretical propositions: outcomes as performance attractors 
11 
12  In the complexity sciences, attractors are characteristics of complex adaptive systems which 
determine patterns of behaviour and long-term system trajectories. Their technical definition is 
mathematical, 
referring to the spectrum of possible evolutionary paths in dynamic systems facilitated by shared 
14 attraction to a set of underpinning parameters (Holland 1995). In organisational settings, attractors have 
15 been described as the structural factors determining regularities in the behaviour of self-organising 
16 actors by generating meaning within action. Attractors have drawn attention in public management 
scholarship since their manipulation could provide some prediction and control of organisational 
behaviour in inter-institutional administrative environments characterised by self-organisation (Bovaird 
18 2008). 
19 
20  In an organisational context, authors have noted the strong conceptual affinity between 
attractors and ‘shared values’, which provide common ground and cultural affinity by lowering the 
expectation of 
goal misalignment or deviant behaviour (Dolan et al. 2003; Palmberg 2009). Shared values provide a 
22 relational basis to coordinate activity on the presumption of trust and the absence of formal inspection 
23 or accountability regimes. Others have understood attractors through the related concept of ‘shared 
24 visions’ which provide common goals and a shared frame of reference to organise collective adaptation 
toward a mutually-desired future system state (Gilstrap 2005; Pedder and MacBeath 2008). The 
emphasis on unified shared values and visions sits somewhat uncomfortably with the diversity of 
26 perspectives found in inter-institutional settings and the goal ambiguity of complex challenges. We 
27 entertain the alternative idea that performance attractors function as mechanisms for alliance-building 
28 and collective sensemaking on the recognition of interdependent rather than unified shared visions 
(Weick 1995). Outcomes have a strong conceptual affinity with this conception of attractors, providing 
a suitably high-level focal point and steering mechanism for navigating interdependencies without 
30 compromising the validity of differentiated goals. 
31 
We provisionally define performance attractors as performance measures which promote coordinated  
learning and adaptation across institutional boundaries through building shared commitment toward  
33 interdependent values and visions. This definition shares the traditional concern of PMM theory with 
34 enabling  coordinated  action  amongst  differentiated  actors  (Micheli  and  Neely  2010)  and  using 
35 performance information for goal-directed improvement (Moynihan et al. 2011), however it adopts very 
different processes for enacting these functions. Notably, performance attractors operate through a 
model  of  motivation  which  is  based  on  the  reinforcement  of  internally-held  motivations  and 
37 responsibilities toward interdependent (though not necessarily unified) values and visions, rather than 
38 external reward or sanction. In a research context, ‘performance attraction’ may therefore be a useful 
39 theoretical frame to analyse the forms of indirect influence attached to existing performance 
frameworks  which  have  eschewed  direct  results-based  accountability.  To  guide  initial empirical 
analysis, Table 1 contrasts two key theoretical propositions of traditional PMM with an alternative 
41 ‘performance attraction’ logic of performance information use which pertains to these two 
42 aforementioned functional domains of performance management: coordination and improvement. 
43 


















 Traditional performance management Performance Attraction 
Proposition 1: 
Coordination 
Performance measures are cascaded 
through subsidiary units of organisation 
by a central authority and actors are held 
to account for measured performance 
Performance measures build a 
collective sense of responsibility for 
interdependent goals while permitting 
autonomous navigation of individual 
contexts 
 





























16 Our first proposition considers that performance attractors seek to coordinate institutional behaviour 
17 by generating patterns of behavioural change motivated by the shared values and interdependent visions described earlier in this section. Developing shared values and interdependent visions might 
help engender a sense of responsibility amongst particular communities for common outcomes 
19 (Nowell and Boyd 2014), motivating voluntaristic behaviour change in the absence of a direct 
20 controller. Performance attractors might also operate through more coercive mechanisms of peer and 
21 horizontal accountability rooted in adherence to shared values (Schillemans 2008), in which the 
22 collective upholding of visions and values is regulated by communities of peers. Performance 
23 attractors also operate in a multi-level context, where regimes of vertical and result-based 
24 accountability may well persist at organisational or individual levels. 
25 Our second proposition considers that performance attractors motivate improved performance through 
26 an internal drive to uphold collective values and visions. This links with the significance attached to 
27 intrinsic motivation for learning and improvement noted in critical PMM literature, which may 
provide a basis for a learning-focussed performance regime (Jakobsen et al. 2017). In recognition that 
performance in complex settings is determined by the effectiveness of interdependent systems, not the 
29 efficiency of any particular actor or function (French et al. 2020), performance attractors would 
30 pursue improvement through enabling collective and dialogic learning and adaptation across 
31 traditional institutional boundaries. Inter-institutional performance dialogues may also promote the 
32 emergence of norms, values and professional standards for behaviour and so support the co- 




37 This paper explores the two theoretical propositions developed in the previous section through a cross- 
38 case analysis of three outcomes frameworks operating in an inter-institutional context at regional, 
national, and international levels. Through studying phenomena of interest in a naturalistic context, case 
study research can establish and refine theoretical relationships by recognising patterns and drawing 
40 inferences to theoretical relationships by studying phenomena of interest in a naturalistic context 
41 (Eisenhardt 1989; Ridder 2017). Multiple cases function as a distinct analytic unit through which 
42 theorised relationships and propositions can be explored, with regularities strengthening confidence in 
theoretical  relationships  (Yin  1994).  Such  case  study  designs  are  employed  to  advance  theory 
development by testing and elaborating hypothesised concepts and relationships (Ridder 2017). 
44 
45 Cases were selected using theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989) to meet the research purpose of 
46 developing the concept of performance attractors. None of our three cases assigned direct accountability 
for outcomes, and each operated on an inter-institutional basis. All cases were of a suitably advanced 
stage, determined by the specification of a full suite of performance indicators to measure and track 
48 progress toward goals. Initiatives were chosen at different levels (regional, national and international), 
49 to explore theoretical validity across contexts and improve robustness (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Yin 
50 1994). The three selected cases are described below. 
51 The United Nations Agenda 2030 
52 In September 2015, the UN’s Agenda 2030 was launched to succeed the Millennium Development 










Performance measures improve 
individual performance by coupling 
results-based accountability with 
managerial autonomy 
 Performance measures spur collective 
learning and adaptation based on a fluid 
and developing understanding of 
institutional interdependencies.  
 
 





















10 Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs), or ‘global goals’, developed by a multi-lateral Open 
11 Working Group under the UN Secretary General. Overall political leadership for the UNSDGs was 
12 committed to a ’High Level Political Forum’ (HLPF) established in 2012, with a remit for sharing 
13 practices and changing national sustainable development policy. The HLPF oversees a system of 
14 follow up and implementation, with voluntary national and thematic reviews conducted by Member 
States a central mechanism to review national progress toward UNSDGs. A range of other 
mechanisms were also established alongside the UNSDGs to expediate implementation, including 
16 technology transfer amongst partnerships, data development and implementation, and a funding 
17 mechanism to accelerate innovations (UN 2013; UN 2014; UN 2015). 
18 An Inter-Agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Development Goal Indicators was established by 
19 the UN Statistical Commission in 2015 to oversee the development of the UNSDGs’ global indicator 
20 set, support national statistical capabilities, and improve data use in national development. The full list 
21 of 169 indicators and 232 tracker indicators supporting the UNSDGs were published in 2017 (UN 
22 2017), however data gaps and methodological deficiencies were still being addressed at time of writing. 
23 Scotland’s National Performance Framework 
24 
25 
In 2007 Scotland’s incoming national government abolished departmental ministerial portfolios and 
embarked upon a new cross-government modality of working (Elliot 2020). Following interest in 
27 models  of  outcome-based  working  internationally  (Mackie  2018;  Wallace  2019)  the  Scottish 
28 Government developed its National Performance Framework (NPF), a whole-of-government outcomes 
29 framework seeking to establish a unified governmental purpose and monitor progress toward national 
30 social objectives. The original NPF set out a ten-year vision for the Scottish Government, underpinned 
31 by 15 National Outcomes which together represented the full and measurable expression of the Scottish 
Government’s strategic intentions. National Outcomes were disaggregated into 45 National Indicators 
33 intended to provide a coherent direction of travel. 
34 The NPF was enshrined in legislation through the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015, with 
35 a duty placed on Scottish Ministers to consult on and review National Outcomes every five years. A National Performance Unit set up within the Scottish Government in 2018 provided operational 
leadership for the NPF within the Scottish Government and facilitate its adoption inside the Scottish 
37 Government. The NPF was reviewed in 2011, 2016 and 2018 by the Scottish Government in response 
38 to  data  deficiencies  and  new  data  availability,  the  introduction  of  new  policies  and  changing 
39 governmental priorities. A new National Outcome for older people was added in 2011, while others 
40 were revised and reworded over time. National Indicators expanded from 45 to 50 in 2011, to 55 in 
41 2016, and to 81 in 2018 to provide a more comprehensive picture of national progress. 2011 and 2016 
refreshes focussed on technical improvements in NPF datasets, however the 2018 refresh was much 
more significant, shifting the focus and purpose of the NPF from a whole-of-government approach to a 
43 whole-of-society approach. The NPF was so rebranded as ‘Scotland’s Wellbeing Framework’ (rather 
44 than just the Scottish Government’s), and the National Performance Unit and other actors began to focus 
45 on increasing its operational and use beyond national government. 
46 
47 
48 The Western Australian Alliance to End Homelessness 
49 
50 The Western Australian Alliance to End Homelessness (WAAEH) is a multi-agency collaboration of 
51 individuals and organisations with a shared strategic aim of ending homelessness. In 2018 the 
52 WAAEH launched its “10-Year Strategy” which set ambitious goals including an end to all forms of 































10 experiencing homelessness, and a halving in mortality rates and hospital costs for those exiting 
11 homelessness. In 2019 the WAAEH commissioned the Centre for Social Impact, the University of 
12 Western Australia (CSI UWA) – itself a founding member of the WAAEH - to construct a results- 
13 based accountability framework for its 10-Year Strategy, intending initially to adopt Kania and 
14 Kramer’s (2011) collective impact model based on centralised reporting and decision-making 
processes. Following consultations and a literature review, CSI UWA and WAAEH leaders developed 
a different understanding of social change stemming from complex adaptive systems theory. The 
16 authors of the final Framework developed a radically different approach, based on a collaborative 
17 learning approach of developmental evaluation (Mollinger-Sahba et al. 2019). 
18 The complete WAAEH Framework spans seven interlinked domains, each composed of outcomes, 
19 broken down into targets and measures in a ‘Data Dictionary’ made available on the WAAEH website. 
20 9 WAAEH Strategy Goals form the core of this model, providing the overall shared vision for the 
21 WAAEH collaboration, while the other six goals are more descriptive, seeking to provide instruction 
22 and guidance for partners to orientate their actions toward this. The multi-level dataset coupled with its 
23 proposed developmental evaluation approach intended to promote recognition and negotiation of the 
interdependencies amongst WAAEH partners, with the framework itself intended to evolve through 
this process. Shortly after the WAAEH Framework was launched in August 2019, the initial 
philanthropic grant under which the WAAEH was operating ended, and the WAAEH Outcomes 
26 Framework has not yet been implemented in practice. Notwithstanding, the CSI UWA has published 
27 updated compilations of some performance indicator results in a ‘Dashboard’ to WAAEH stakeholders 
28 and published an updated version of the Framework. 
29 
30 Data collection and analysis 
31 
32 
Case study research affords the ability to structure comparative analysis and test theory using multiple 33 
sources of data (Yin 1994; Ridder 2017). In all cases a full documentary review was undertaken 34 
incorporating all publicly available datasets and grey literature accompanying each framework. Various 35 
factors prohibited a uniform approach to data collection, including the researcher role in relation to the 36 
outcomes frameworks, the availability of documentary information, and the duration of operation of 37 
each framework. While data collection methods differed, we sought to construct detailed case studies 
38 
of comparable depth of analysis. 
39 
In the NPF case, five semi-structured interviews (45-75 minutes in length) were conducted with Scottish 40 
Government officials occupying key positions relating to the NPF, including senior leadership in the 
41 
Scottish Government, operational leadership for the NPF, and key officers involved in implementation, 
data collation and analysis. Interviews covered the operation and function of the NPF inside and outwith 
the Scottish Government, and also probed intentions behind decisions relating the NPF to give insight 
into the key dimensions of the attractor concept, such as how accountability, collaboration, learning and 
44 decision making processes were arranged around it. These interviews were supplemented with a 
45 document review of Scottish Government published materials relating to the NPF since its inception 
46 (available at https://www.gov.scot/publications/), and a review of external commentary and analyses of 
47 the NPF in academic and grey literatures. 
48 In the WAAEH case, case data draws primarily from the personal involvement of one author in the 
49 design and development of the WAAEH framework. While no explicit observation framework was 
50 used in this process, this involved intensive engagement with Alliance stakeholders and first-hand 
51 experience of key decision making processes related to the WAAEH framework. These observations 
were supported by supplementary research and analysis conducted by the author in the production of 
project  reports  (Mollinger-Sabha  et  al.  2019).  Source  material  included  community consultation 































10 capacity building, reports in national and local media, and website data from the various community, 
11 statutory, and private sector organizations involved. 
12 The UN Agenda 2030 case was supported by such a wide range of documentation, analysis and 
13 commentary that a comparably detailed case account did not require additional primary data collection. 
14 A timeline of key developments was developed from the UN’s publication library and other public 
15 documentation, which provided an outline of development to present. This review was supplemented 
16 firstly by a review of key grey literature compiled by UN agencies and research institutes on the 
17 UNSDGs, and secondly by a review of academic research using Google Scholar, focussing our search 
18 on the attractor concept by including ‘accountability’ and ‘responsibility’ in search parameters. 
19 In line with the replication logic of Yin (1994) and Eisenhardt (1989), our analysis strategy explored 
20 regularities in the design and deployment of outcomes frameworks, linking these regularities to our two 
21 propositions relating to performance attractors. In analyzing these documents and how individual and 
institutional partners made sense of them, an abductive analytical approach allowed us to “confront 
theory with empirical data in an evolving fashion” (Dubois & Araujo 2007, pp. 131), capturing the 
23 relevant features of each case through an iterative return from our data to the literature, and adding 




28 In this section we draw together findings from the three case studies to address our two propositions 29 developed in the theoretical section. 
30 Proposition 1: Performance measures build a collective sense of responsibility for 
31 interdependent goals while permitting autonomous navigation of individual contexts 
32 
33 Building partnerships 
34 All three initiatives were partnership endeavours requiring cooperation across institutional boundaries. 
35 In line with the first proposition, outcomes played a strong coordinative function in partnership 
36 building, building a sense of identity and commonality of mission. Agenda 2030 was positioned in 
37 founding documents (UN 2015) as a multilateral partnership endeavour, with partnership itself 
38 enshrined as a distinct UNSDG. The 2017 Secretary General report to the HLPF called for the UN to 
39 use its convening power to broker the partnerships needed to tackle interlinked UNSDGs. The 
40 initiation of partnerships to tackle the UNSDGs was thus considered a significant success measure for 
the UN, with over 5,200 registered at time of writing. The WAAEH’s founder-members were 
similarly jointly committed to its 9 Strategy Outcomes as the core of the framework and a shared 
42 expression of mission (Mollinger-Sabha et al. 2019, pp. 9). The NPF had initially adopted a narrower 
43 focus, with its principal concern for facilitating post-departmental working within the Scottish 
44 Government, and with only weak ties to external actors. Interviewees noted a significant redirection 
45 around 2018 in the function and scope of the NPF from a whole-of-government to a whole-of-society 
46 approach, and a concomitant repositioning of the National Outcomes as goals for all of Scotland, 
47 rather than just the Scottish Government. 
48 Each framework depended to a significant degree on partners and other stakeholders’ volitional 
49 reorientation of strategy or practice toward external objectives within outcomes frameworks. This 
required in all three cases an active marketing, branding and awareness raising strategy. Interviewees 
noted the establishment of the National Performance Unit played a key role in extending the focus of 
51 the NPF beyond government, leading a substantial promotion campaign at public events, building 
52 strategic alliances with civil society organisations, and establishing an active social media presence 































10 several governmental directorates, civil society representative bodies and the Scottish National Health 
11 Service, while others underway at time of writing. The UNSDGs similarly featured a large social 
12 media campaign and an active approach to brokering partnerships. The focus of Agenda 2030 on 
13 branding and awareness raising had rendered them a household name with a recent survey indicating 
14 three quarters of adults globally had familiarity with the UNSDGs (Ipsos Mori 2019). With a more 
substantial pull factor, the UN could point to a wide range of integrations (including over 5,200 listed 
partnerships) with businesses, governments, civil society organisations and other civic bodies like 
16 universities. 
17 
References to ‘buy-in’, ‘sign-up’, ‘harmonisation’ or ‘adoption’ are evident in discourse surrounding 
the NPF and UNSDGs which implies a unilateral method of adoption, however in practice this was 
19 much more of a two-way process. All frameworks undertook a substantial consultation and 
20 engagement processes to develop outcomes and indicators expressive of a collective and co-created 
21 rather than imposed vision. The 2018 refresh of the NPF was accompanied by a much more 
22 significant public consultation process conducted under an NPF roundtable involving Scottish 
23 Ministers, civil society groups, and local authority representation with over 200 organisational 
responses were reviewed by Scottish Government officials. The creation of the UNSDGs was 
conducted under a similar body, a multi-lateral Open Working Group to ensure adequate 
representation by Member States. While CSI UWA was responsible for the development of the 
26 WAAEH framework, it was also developed through consultation to ensure its content and focus could 
27 be collectively signed up to by all key stakeholders’ values, including those with a lived experience of 
28 homelessness. 
29 Permitting local adaptation 
30 
31 We mused in the theoretical section about the tension between imposing a shared vision and maintaining 
existing individual and organisational goals. The coordinative potential of outcomes was practiced not 
by seeking merely to homogenise a strategic approach across stakeholders, but by legitimising and even 
33 promoting variation to respond to different institutional contexts. Outcome measures provided a useful 
34 focal point to arrange this loose coupling of strategy. All frameworks featured a set of high-level 
35 outcomes (NPF National Outcomes, UNSDGs and WAAEH Strategy Outcomes) which functioned as 
36 universally applicable shared goals of sufficient breadth and ambiguity to permit local and contextually- 
37 informed interpretation of their relevance. In the implemented cases this facilitated the construction of 
new alliances and policy alignment across tiers of government. This approach was typified by the UN’s 
stated commitment to ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ across Member States facing very 
39 different national challenges (UN 2015). In the NPF case, a 2008 concordat jointly signed by the 
40 Scottish Government and local authorities used National Outcomes as jointly agreed priorities but 
41 permitted local interpretation of outcomes and autonomy in the allocation of resources to pursue these. 
42 The  coordinative  power  afforded  by  performance  attractors  was  enacted  not  merely  through 
43 homogenising a worldview and strategy across institutional actors, but by upholding the validity of 
44 multiple interpretations of performance goals. 
45 Voluntarism and accountability in implementation 
46 While the diffuse nature of cases clearly eschews the potential for top-down and results-based 
47 accountability to play any prominent role, our discussion of performance attractors does not exclude 
48 other modalities of accountability, such as those operating horizontally (such as peer accountability) 
49 or bottom-up (such as social accountability). Indeed, some Scottish Government interviewees 
50 considered the NPF an extension of governmental accountability, though one not reducible to 
particular individuals, teams or organisations. Similar sentiments regarding an aspiration for collective 
accountability can be found in the WAAEH (Mollinger-Sabha et al. 2019), although this group 
52 rejected Kania and Kramer’s (2011) results-based model. NPF data was published on the ‘Scotland 

































10 however its website has remained little accessed, and while its data been routinely used as an  
11 accountability tool, for instance in policy scrutiny, this has remained sporadic (Mackie 2018; Wallace  
12 2019). The international context of the UNSDGs provided perhaps a better context for realising social  
13 accountability, permitting civil society groups, the media and the polity of Member States to exert  
14 pressure on governmental performance using UNSDG data, however here too there is little evidence 
indicating effectiveness in this regard. Both WAAEH and Agenda 2030 also created leadership bodies  
which held a key coordinative function for the implementation of the framework, and which could  
16 exert some horizontal control through establishing expected standards of performance or norms of  
17 participation, however in no case was there any explicit formalisation of peer accountability regimes  
18 as considered in the discussion of this proposition.  
19 Proposition 2: Performance measures spur collective learning and adaptation based on a fluid 
20 and developing understanding of institutional interdependencies. 
21 
22 
23 A developmental approach to performance measurement 
24 The second proposition asserts the purpose of performance information is for promoting learning 
25 rather than controlling behaviour. Each case faced an initial task in this regard to develop a 
26 performance information system detailed and expressive enough of high-level outcomes to enable effective learning and collective sensemaking. The NPF indicator set was a collation of multiple 
existing datasets, and interviewees noted significant work was ongoing ten years later to ensure data 
28 was routinely updated, methodologically robust and comparable. The UNSDGs were similarly 
29 intentioned as a roadmap enabling Member States to determine their place in a collective movement 
30 toward shared goals (UN 2015; UN 2017), standards and capacity for data collection and analysis 
31 varied drastically among Member States. Consequently, the Secretary General called for a ‘data 
32 revolution’ to support the UNSDGs, and an Inter-Agency and Expert Group established by the UN 
Statistical Commission in 2016 was established to oversee the development of the UNSDGs’ global 
indicator set, develop national statistical capabilities, and improve data use in national development. 
34 The full list of 169 indicators and 232 tracker indicators were published in 2017 (UN 2017), however 
35 data gaps and methodological deficiencies were still being addressed at time of writing. 
36 The NPF outcome and indicator set exhibited a similar dynamism over time as it interacted with a 
37 changing policy environment, emerging data availability and shifting governmental priorities. 2011 
38 and 2016 refreshes represented technical improvements in NPF datasets, along with one additional 
39 National Outcome for older people responding to government priority. National Indicators expanded 
40 from 45 to 50 in 2011, to 55 in 2016, and to 81 in 2018 to provide a more comprehensive picture of 
41 national progress. While it was not implemented, this situation was anticipated in the WAAEH case, 
42 which positioned its developmental evaluation approach as a method to navigate data insufficiency 
and revise the framework itself. Indeed, while data insufficiency was an endemic and enduring 
problem it was not as significant a barrier to implementation as it would have been under a traditional 
44 performance management approach. Instead, the navigation of data gaps and the iterative revision of 
45 indicators, analysis procedures and data use was a dynamic and developmental process. The 
46 improvement of performance information systems was regarded in this way as an innate benefit of 
47 taking an outcomes-based approach by Scottish Government interviewees and within the UN’s 
48 documentation (UN 2017). 
49 Formalising routines of data use for learning in organisational functions 
50 Both implemented cases worked to establish routines for learning from performance information over 
51 the course of their development. A central mechanism for collective sensemaking and learning transfer 
52 for the UNSDGs were the ‘voluntary national reviews’ conducted by Member States into their progress 

































10 NPF was slower to incorporate a learning function, and while the variety and reliability of statistical 
11 infrastructure improved through both national and local government efforts over the years of the NPF’s 
12 operation, budgetary decisions made by both remained largely unlinked to NPF data (Wallace 2019). 
There were more recent attempts at establishing routines of use for performance information for 
learning and improved decision making. By embedding the NPF on a statutory basis, the Scottish 
14 Government committed to periodic consultation and inquiry into National Outcomes roughly in line 
15 with the government’s political cycle. Interviewees also noted a renewed push toward using NPF data 
16 in budgetary and strategic planning processes within the Scottish Government at time of interview. 
17 
18 Establishing platforms and norms for dialogic learning 
19 
20 Our   theoretical   discussion   highlighted   the   potential   for   performance   attractors   to motivate 
21 improvements at the systemic level through prompting what Rajala et al. (2019) call boundary-crossing 
22 performance dialogues amongst institutional actors. In the Agenda 2030 case, the HLPF served as a 
23 collaborative forum for discussion of linkages and commonalities drawing from UNSDG data, 
particularly from voluntary national reviews. With a stronger focus on implementation and follow-up 
than the preceding Millennium Development Goals, the UN took an increasingly interventionist 
25 approach to motivating the transfer of learning, developing various mechanisms to fostering partnership 
26 working and knowledge transfer using UNSDG data. The most significant of these were: 
27 • The “Technology Facilitation Mechanism”, launched in 2015 providing a multi-stakeholder 
28 forum for sharing science, technology and innovations to achieve the UNSDGs. 
29 • A Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data, also launched in 2015, a network of 
30 more than 300 institutions who jointly contribute to improving data quality, availability and 
31 accessibility for the UNSDGs, and work to promote data use amongst businesses, governments, 
32 and civil society groups. 
33 • A Joint SDG Fund launched in 2019 (succeeding the 2014 Sustainable Development Goals 
34 Fund) to enable UN agencies and Member States to undertake innovative partnership responses 
to the UNSDGs and leverage external public and private financing. 
• An online knowledge platform steadily developed from 2015, consisting of online hubs for 
36 partnerships, e-learning, and a knowledge repository relating to UNSDGs. 
37 
The WAAEH outcomes framework was provided a holistic assessment not simply of the state of 
homelessness, but also drivers to homelessness entry and exit across Western Australia’s diverse 
39 political, geographic and socio-economic contexts. Its purpose was to centre discussions not on 
40 organisational improvement but on creating innovation at boundary spaces between institutions and 
41 improving collective, rather than individual performance. In this context the framework was a tool for 
analysing the non-linear and interdependent paths of causality between the various outcomes and 
indicators, moving away from the assumption that the actions of the Alliance were causally responsible 
43 for these. Its developmental evaluation approach would then have enabled collective sensemaking 
44 among the continually updated results across the multi-levelled performance indicators. Through this 
45 process, learning was positioned as a reflexive and collaborative process pertaining not just to 
movement in indicators, but with their ongoing relevance and utility in a dynamic policy context 
47 (Mollinger-Sabha et al. 2019). 
48 While all cases attempted to use outcomes frameworks to promote learning across institutional 
49 boundaries, there remains little evidence concerning how effective such efforts have been in practice. 
50 For example, 142 countries have to date completed a national review for Agenda 2030, however little information is available relating the effectiveness of these as a learning mechanism either within 
Member States, or clarity about how learning is intended to diffuse. On the other hand, with more 
52 than 5,000 partnership initiatives noted active at time of writing, there are many examples of 
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10 pathways. Indeed, even in the unimplemented WAAEH case for example, the Western Australian 
11 government launched a State Homelessness Strategy in late 2019 that both explicitly references the 
12 WAAEH Framework, and offered a significant re-framing of homelessness toward alignment with the 
13 idea of homelessness as a complex system consisting of pathways of interaction. The NPF’s 
14 comparative lack of leadership bodies or direct platforms for facilitating learning led to a more 
restricted and ad hoc pattern of use in cross-functional governmental operations like strategic 
planning, budgeting and policy analysis (Wallace 2019). This was at time of interview being 
16 redressed through an increasingly active approach to data use and learning transfer, facilitated by the 
17 National Performance Unit and senior leadership. Interviewees noted at least five other initiatives and 
18 agencies which had undertaken significant attempts to adopt or integrate the NPF into their own 
19 performance management frameworks, and efforts were underway to integrate the NPF with 
20 Scotland’s leading multi-agency public sector leadership network to speed implementation. 
21 Conclusions: performance attraction as an alternative to traditional 
23 performance management? 
24 
We have described an emerging theory of performance attraction, in which coordination and collective 
improvement is ‘attracted’ through the valency of performance measures and the implementation of 
26 performance frameworks as dialogical learning mechanisms. This alternative PMM logic diverges 
27 considerably from traditional control-oriented approaches deriving from management control theory 
28 and cybernetics, and can be distinguished as Figure 1 shows in both the formulation and implementation 
29 of PMM systems. 
30 Figure 1. Two logics of performance management: control-oriented performance management and 
31 performance attraction 
32 
33 
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10 The formulation of PMM systems has traditionally been a technical exercise directed by a central 
11 authority with limited external consultation. Recognising that the valency of outcomes depended on 
12 their resonance with the values and visions of key stakeholders, cases pursued instead an inclusive and 
developmental approach to constructing and revising outcomes and performance indicators. Regarding 
the implementation of PMM systems, control-oriented PMM presumes the existence of a powerful 
14 central authority to impose the necessary accountabilities and incentives to control agentic behaviour. 
15 Lacking  such  an  entity,  cases  adopted  a  much  more  active  and  collaborative  approach  to 
16 implementation: marketing and publicising frameworks to help external actors buy-in, sign-up or hook- 
on to outcomes frameworks; building alliances and brokering learning partnerships amongst key 
institutions; and improving collective intelligence as data gaps and interdependencies become better 
18 understood or priorities shifted. In this alterative ‘performance attraction’ logic, performance measures 
19 are less technical elements of PMM systems than organising instruments to navigate complex and inter- 
20 institutional performance management landscapes. 
21 We contribute to a growing body of critical PMM theory in the public and private sectors which has 
22 explored alternatives to standard control-oriented PMM modalities (Moynihan et al. 2011; Melynk et 
23 al. 2014; Jakobsen et al. 2017; Bourne et al. 2018; Rajala et al. 2019; French et al. 2020). Specifically, 
24 performance attraction redirects focus from the technocratic elements of PMM system design to the 
dialogic and boundary-crossing usage of performance information called for by Rajala et al. (2019), 
and provides a mechanism through which architects of outcomes frameworks might cultivate the 
26 stewarding behaviours seen as necessary by French et al. (2020) to tackle complex goals in inter- 
27 institutional settings. It stands also to promote the fostering of professional autonomy and self- 
28 organisation of lower administrative units noted by authors such as Melynk et al. (2014) needed to 
29 navigate complex environments. 
30 While recent PMM literature has placed greater focus on performance information use, there remains a 
31 lack of guidance for how effective performance management regimes may be designed (Jakobsen et al. 
32 2017). Our findings provide practical design guidance for architects of outcomes frameworks which 
might  contribute  to  their  success.  We  argue  that  effective  performance  attraction  involves  co- 
constructing outcomes frameworks to ensure they resonate with the values and ambitions of partners, 
34 recognising and promoting local autonomy and variation, convening spaces for partners to participate 
35 meaningfully in collective learning processes, and pursuing active and mission-led marketing and 
36 awareness raising strategies. Findings therefore deepen understanding of how governments, public 
agencies and other institutions can retain some coordinative control as they embrace bolder and more 
challenging missions requiring inter-institutional integration and coordination and the navigation of 
38 complexity.  Further  research  may  explore  how,  by  adopting  a  performance  attraction  logic, 
39 performance management may usefully connect with a range of entities where performance measures 
40 are less often adopted, such as informal alliances, strategic networks and social movements. 
41 Findings go some way to clarifying how a performance attraction logic might be operationalised in 
42 practice,  however  raise  additional  questions,  particularly  concerning  the  potential  roles  for 
43 accountability and responsibility. Our discussion of both propositions noted the potential role that 
44 horizontal models of accountability might play in upholding collective visions and values, however 
these methods remained underdeveloped in the empirical analysis. Reliance on voluntaristic behaviour 
change can be accused of lacking teeth, holding weak incentives and relying too heavily on supportive 
46 and  egalitarian  cultures  among  external  actors  (Le  Grand  2010;  Hood  2012).  The  existence of 
47 conflicting institutional goals might also ‘crowd out’ goal-directed improvement (Jakobsen et al. 2017). 
Each case shows evidence that frameworks had prompted organisational adaptation and increased 
partnership working, however without detailed analysis of the behavioural response to performance 
49 attractors the significance of changes effected cannot be evaluated. 
50 
51 With just three cases the findings must be considered tentative, however analysis across contexts and 
levels of operation seems to imply the construct has a degree of generality which can support further 
testing to progress along the theory development pipeline (Ridder 2017). A limitation is that the study 























10 evaluative This article lays the groundwork for further studies which explore the institutional response 
11 to performance attraction. 
12 
We do not consider that performance attraction is a panacea for performance management. Indeed, 
lacking strong external accountabilities, performance attractors might stand accused of lacking teeth in 
14 environments characterised by strong external incentives, individualistic cultures, or diverse and 
15 competing accountabilities. In inter-institutional contexts, performance attractors are also likely to 
16 interact  with  standard  performance  targets  at  multiple  levels  (for  instance  individual,  team, 
17 organisational and extra-organisational), and the incentives they provide may be crowded out. The 
18 concept may also have a dark side, since the introduction of new measures might overburden actors 
19 with existing accountabilities, might sideline oppositional viewpoints, or might inspire lip service or 
‘window dressing’ adaptation but fail ultimately to influence behaviour. Future studies should explore 
whether and in which contexts these negative elements materialise, and the differential opportunities 
21 and challenges offered by ‘weak’ (reliant on voluntarism) and ‘strong’ (reliant on more coercive forms 
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